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Agamben, Girard and the 
Life that Does Not Live 
Brian Sudlow 
'Life does not live', the epigram deployed by Theodor Adomo at the start of 
Minima Moralia, embodied Adorno's conviction that life could not flourish at 
a time when production superseded it in importance.' In the dedication to this 
very work, Adomo observes caustically: 'Our perspective of life has passed into 
an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life no longer'.2 The Minima 
Moralia reflect on the fallout of this ideology in the bourgeois-created, consumer-
led Western societies of the mid-twentieth century. Undoubtedly, his other source 
of pessimism in this work can be located in the long shadow of the concentration 
camp, the gloom of which had reached Adomo in his US exile during World War 
II: 'The subject still fe.els sure of its autonomy, but the nullity demonstrated to 
subjects by the concentration camp is already overtaking the form of subjectivity 
itself' .3 Paradoxically, as if the subject's autonomy were always dependent on 
social recognition, this collapse of subjectivity resulted from the impact which 
total exclusion from the community had had on the individual within the paradigm 
of the camp. Indeed, what could be more isolating, and thereby more destructive 
for the individual, than to be thrust beyond the realms of recognized humanity, 
subject to unbridled violence, and exiled to the darkness outside human and divine 
law where Giorgio Agamben will locate his homo sacer? 
It is right to elect major cultural commentators like Adomo as our interlocutors, 
as we seek to try to understand ourselves, our history and our very own life. 
However bad the concentration camps were, nevertheless, the pre-Holocaust 
world itself was far from Edenic. Without wishing to mobilize the Holocaust for 
any cause whatsoever, one cannot help drawing correlations between the isolation 
and death which it so emblematically r~presents to Adorno's mind and to ours, 
and the forms of isolation, dislocation and death - beyond the alienating effects 
of overproduction lamented by Adomo - experienced by many Western people 
1 Theodor Adomo, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: Verso, 
2005 (1951]), p. 19. The epigram is in fact a quotation from Ferdinand KUmberger, an 
obscure Viennese writer whose only previous claim to fame was to have been cited by 
Wittgenstein at the opening of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
2 Ibid., p. 15. 
3 Ibid., p. 16. 
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within the fifty years that preceded and coincided with it. Applying Adorno's 
concern with life to their case, we could ask how life might live for those who, like 
the Surrealists and the Dadaists, embraced Nietzsche's announcement of the death 
of God and turned increasingly towards the realms of absurdity, expressing the 
isolation of the thinking mind from Christian, deist or even rationalist teleologies. 
How might life live for those who endured the daily horror of trench warfare and 
witnessed first-hand the transformation of northern France and the Low Countries 
into the greatest open charnel house until that time? How might life live also, for 
those who, confronted with such isolation, dislocation and death, were turning 
away from the Enlightenment's unfulfilled promises of progress and .asking, with 
T.S. Eliot in Choruses from The Rock, 'Where is the Life we have lost in living?'4 
Eliot's rhetorical question suggests that the life 'that does not live' has in fact 
been disguised by a simulacrum of life which ha;tobscured true life in a flurry of 
inauthentic activity. More significantly, however, it also implies that the recovery of 
that lost life is not as remote a possibility as Adorno 's judgement seems to assume. 
Unquestionably, therefore, Adorno's anxieties about a life ruined by production 
and devastated by the disintegration of subjectivity find many correlations within 
modernity. The problem this chapter faces, however, is that to search for an answer 
to Adomo's question about life while ignoring the problem of life as posed by 
Eliot in 1934 - that some kinds of living are the enemies of an authentic life-
promises a counsel merely for survival. Moreover, the problem of life necessarily 
raises the problem of the subject: who lives? Is it in fact life that lives, or do life 
and the problems associated with it not inevitably raise again the possibility of the 
divine subject who in the Christian tradition claims to be Life itself? 
In order to elaborate answers to such questions, this chapter will first consider 
the subject and the matter of life as embodied by Giorgio Agamben 's homo sacer, 
a figure embedded in the experience of the Holocaust and emblematic also of 
the emergence of biopolitics as announced by Michel Foucault. Agamben's view 
of the subject of life is written into his analysis of how the very existence of 
sovereignty is founded on the power to exclude that subject, the homo sacer. His 
proposition for the matter of life, on the other hand, is contained in his critique of 
how the Western tradition of political thought has divided what he will call bios 
from zoe, a distinction which stands in need of rigorous questioning. 
A ready foil for this analysis of Agamben is found in the work ofRene Girard. 
Girard's work has been contrasted several times with Agamben's in recent 
scholarship but not yet in ways that address this key question of life. While Col by 
Dickinson has analysed the correlations between Agamben and Girard on the topic 
of mimesis, and Christopher A. Fox has considered the ways in which these two 
major critics have distinguished and differentiated politics and religion, Frederiek 
Depoortere has cast doubts over the solidity of Agamben 's analysis of homo sacer 
and turns to Girard's reading of the figure of the scapegoat as a means of clarifying 
4 T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 2002), p. 140. 
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the difficulties posed by Agamben.5 By analysing still further the terrain which 
separates Agamben from Girard, this chapter will seek to reassess what exactly 
Agamben and Girard propose as the life that can live, and what the divergences 
between their findings signify. 
Agam ben's Bare Life 
For Agamben, there is no sense in which the subject of political life, the 'who' 
of living, is anything else than the anthropic agent or agents; this is true, even 
though part of Agamben's philosophical work has been to dismantle what he calls 
the anthropological machinery which has historically sought to conceptualize 
humanity ontologically, rather than as a cultural construct.6 Whatever )Jv8p(J)7COr; 
ultimately means, the anthropic agent, whom Agamben will come to reinterpret 
from the perspective of the homo sacer, remains for Agamben the central figure of 
political life in the contemporary period with all its biopolitical possibilities. There 
are no other knowing agents who can contribute to this project for life. 
Agamben's concern in his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life is to 
unpack and develop the notion of biopolitics first broached by Michel Foucault 
in his history of sexuality and developed further in later writings and lectures. 
For Foucault, the threshold of biological modernity, signalled by the themacity 
of sexuality which arose during the Enlightenm~nt, was also marked by a sea 
change which saw ~e simple living body becoming central to the state's political 
strategies. As Foucault argued in his 1978-79 lectures at the College de France, 
biopolitics emerged in the eighteenth century as governments began 'to rationalise 
the problems posed ... by phenomena characteristic of a set ofliving beings forming 
a population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race'.7 Capitalism itself, 
claims Foucault, was in part rendered possible by the kinds of discipline which 
biopolitical control made possible. 
For Agamben, the impact of this biopolitical shift on the cultural episteme- the 
cluster of relations between discourses which express a culture's self-understanding 
-'constitutes the decisive event of modernity' and colours all strands of modem 
~i 
5 Frederiek Depoortere, 'Reading Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer with Rene 
Girard', Philosophy Today (2011): 108-17; Colby Dickinson, 'Beyond Violence, Beyond 
the Text: The Role of Gesture in Waiter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben, and its Affinity 
with the Work ofRene Girard', Heythrop Journal, 52 (2011): 952-61; Christopher A. Fox, 
'Sacrificial Pasts and Messianic Futures: Religion as a Political Prospect in Rene Girard and 
Giorgio Agamben', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33/5 (2007): 563-95. 
6 See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin 
Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 [2002)). 
7 Michel Foucault, The Birth ofBiopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-
1979, Michel Sennellart (ed.), traos. Graham Burchell (Basiogstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008 [2004]), p. 315. 
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politics, even the most extreme, with all the enigmas that they pose for life itself.8 
Yet, far from being content with this conceptualization ofbiopolitics as a uniquely 
modern phenomenon, Agamben discovers a foreshadowing of biopoliticization 
in two instances of classical thought and culture, both of which cast light on the 
perennial political problem of the state of exception, especially because of the 
processes to which they subject life itself. Life and its differentiation from death 
have always been a central consideration of how sovereignty is constituted, but 
the foregrounding of biological life under the conditions of biopolitics allows 
Agamben to pose the question of sovereignty again in a different light. 
Accordingly, Agamben notes that the Greeks originally used two words for 
life: zoe and bios. Zoe denotes just life in general or bare life, as Agamben comes 
to call it; bios, on the other hand, is a particular kind of life, perfected individually 
by virtue and socially by politics. The entire Western tradition of politics which 
has incorporated bare life into the city through individual or political virtue has, 
Agamben argues, achieved this inclusion paradoxically through an act of exclusion. 
Bare life, or zoe, is included or eo-opted into the political domain because of its 
potential to supply the raw lifeline of a particular bios, but excluded by the same 
token because it does not remain itself.9 
The importance of this initially linguistic distinction of zoe and bios does 
not appear clear until we consider the second adumbration of biopolitics which 
Agamben detects in classical culture: the figure of the homo sacer. In the writings 
of Pompeius Festus, a grammarian and etymologist of the second century AD, the 
homo sacer is defined as 
the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted 
to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; 
in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that 'if someone kills the one who 
is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide'. This is 
why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.10 
The use of the word 'sacred' in the context of purity and impurity requires 
contextualization. In its original meaning, 'sacred' denotes in fact that which 
is set aside or reserved for use in relation to worship. Such an action, however, 
exposes the sacred object to interpretation through the categories of cleanness 
and uncleanness. The ambivalence of the sacred, thus conceived, appears. in the 
work of numerous early anthropologists, notably William Robertson Smith and 
Emile Durkheim. Now, while the concept of taboo is often used to manage this 
ambivalence, Agamben rejects this as a way of explaining the phenomenon of the 
homo sacer. Instead, he argues that homo sacer was a category which emerged when 
8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998 [1995]), p. 4. 
9 Ibid., pp. 9 and I I. 
1° Cited in ibid., p. 71. 
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sovereign power posed an act that was self-constituting by placing an individual 
beyond human and divine law. The homo sacer is beyond human law because his 
homicide is unpunishable; it would not be unfaithful to Agamben's thought to say 
that the homicide of the homo sacer is in fact literally an act of pesticide. Yet homo 
sacer is also beyond divine law, argues Agamben, because he cannot become the 
victim of a sacrifice; the paradox being that the homo sacer represents a sacredness 
which is antithetical to the domain of the gods. Agamben concludes that the homo 
sacer thus lies beyond the sacred and the profane, the province of divine law and 
the province of human law, and that this exclusion, ordained by sovereign power 
in a self-constituting act, produces or reveals the bare life or zoe that it eo-opts. 
The homo sacer thus models the excluded life which Agamben claims emerges 
from the zoe- bios distinction. Together, they render more explicit the production 
ofbare life which, Agamben argues, is at the heart ofbiopolitics.11 
Critical welcome for this theory in relation to life, death and sovereignty has 
been significant and has crossed disciplinary boundaries. 12 On the other hand, the 
stern est critique of Agamben 's analysis questions his understanding of the primary 
sources. ln Frederiek Depoortere's 2011 article on homo sacer, he argues that 
Agamben's argument fails to account fully for the fact that in the original Latin 
sources the homo sacer is one who has committed a heinous crime. Agamben's 
claim is that such crimes constitute 'the originary exception in which human life 
is included in the political order in being exposed to an unlimited capacity to be 
killed'Y Depoortere's response is that Agamben provides no substantial proof of 
this; in his view, 'it seems more accurate to accept what the sources explicitly 
say and to consider sacratio [that is the condition of the homo sacer] to be the 
punishment for a number of severe crimes, crimes that ... affect the foundational 
relationships of Roman society'. 14 However life is included in the political order, 
therefore, it is not through the mechanism that Agamben has wrongly attributed 
to the figure of the homo sacer, at least in Depoortere's analysis of the primaries. 
Depoortere's objectibn is not the only one which can be made against 
Agamben 's analysis and his characterization of the Western political tradition as 
perennially biopolitical. Even if we accepted Agamben's analysis of homo sdcer 
~s ~ figure ~f Roman culture, why ~houl~ we also accept that the theological or 
JUnsprudenttal postulates of Roman soctety have the same effects as those of 
Christianity which was a dominant influence on the tradition of Western politics 
and whose grand projects have included the recovery of the excluded and the 
exaltation of the humbled? In fact, the entire tradition of sanctuary laws, not only 
in their Christian forms but even in their Roman forerunners, seems to offer a 
refutation of Agamben 's reading of homo sacer. While sanctuary law is thought by 
11 Ibid., pp. 71-4. 
12 See, for example, Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics and Death: Essays on 
Giorgio Agamben s Homo Sacer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). 
13 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 85. 
14 Depoortere, 'Reading GiorgioAgamben'sHomo Sacer', p. Ill. 
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some to have achieved its apogee precisely in the absence of properly constituted 
sovereign power, other readings of the sources find sanctuary, and the attendant 
practices of intercessio, clemency and pardon, to be deeply inscribed in Greek, 
Roman and Christian legal traditions which are at the same time predicated 
on clear conceptualizations of sovereign power. 15 Given the thousand years of 
jurisprudential history in which sanctuary legislation was implemented widely 
across Europe, the idea that sovereign power generally constitutes itself through 
some self-constituting act of excluding the homo sacer is entirely moot. 16 
Another objection to Agamben's arguments can be formulated as follows. 
Agamben's treatment of the distinction ofzoe and bios posits thatzoe is excluded 
by bios, yet this proposition seems to obfuscate rather than clarify the relationship. 
Bios proposes not only to include but to perfe9t zoe, the biological resources of 
which far from exhaust human potential; ind~d the idea that bios excludes zoe 
fails to account for all the benefits which bios, as a chosen form of life, can bring 
to zoe or bare life. In the case of ancient Greece, for example, from the language 
of which Agamben draws the distinction, the bios represented by medical science 
and culture is the very antithesis of a supposed exclusion of natural or pure bodily 
zoe. Rather than excluding zoe, Greek medical culture (or we might say a life 
perfected by medical bios) '[lifted] men up from the bestial level', according to 
Helen King. 17 Moreover, while the sharp distinction of zoe and bios clearly serves 
Agamben's argument about sovereign power, at the same time it leads Agamben 
into creating a simplistic dichotomy which sits uneasily with the intertwining 
narratives ofzoe and bios that shape Greek conceptualizations of the body and of 
the relationship of physicality to the human. 18 Thus, a conceptualization of life as 
divided between zoe and bios, the latter being differentiated by the exclusion of 
the former, is by no means assured. 
Yet if Agamben 's analysis ofbiopolitics does not provide an answer to Adorno 's 
question about life in terms of political science, it at least provides an observational 
and situational one: life is 'this' in the period of biopolitics. More crucially, the 
airbrushing of Christian legal tradition from his analysis of the constitutive elements 
of sovereignty suggests that the kind of life which Agamben observes in the zoe-
bios distinction, and in his reading of homo sacer, is essentially, exclusively and 
deliberately intra-anthropic - intra-anthropic because estranged from the vistas 
15 Karl Shoemaker, Crime and Sanctuary in the Middle Ages 500-1400 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 20 ll ). 
16 Even after consultation with Colby Dickinson, Andrew Norris and Leland de la 
Durantaye, all leading Agamben scholars, this author could find no trace of Agamben ever 
having engaged with the tradition of sanctuary law. 
17 Helen King, 'The Origins of Medicine in the Second Century AD', in Sirnon Gold hill 
and Robin Osbome (eds), Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient Greece (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 262. 
18 Brooke Holmes, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical 
Body in Ancient Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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which theological conceptualizations of the human subject appeal to. In placing 
the state of exception in the context of biopolitics, Agamben has thus succeeded 
in giving an account of sovereign power divorced from the kind of theological 
moderation which sanctuary practices exemplify. Now, while it is unsustainable in 
a European context to airbrush Christian legal tradition from a plenary history of 
how sovereignty is constituted, it is also undeniable that there has been an erosion 
of the influence of Christian legal dispositions over the public square since the 
early modern period. In other words, the secularization of legislative provision in 
European culture has in many ways run parallel to the turn towards biopolitics. 
At this point in the argument, the question, thereby, naturally arises: if in 
the contemporary period of biopolitics the reduction of the human to the bodily 
is what fascist and liberal democratic societies share in common (as Agamben 
argues), might their own intra-anthropic limits be the reason why the former 
could wreak such outward destruction on life, after the other has felt such inward 
destruction (as Adorno and Eliot observed)? How indeed might life live if it is 
locked within the limits which biopoliticization places de facto on human life, 
whether by liberal democratic society or by fascist dictatorship? In this light, 
the conclusion of Agamben 's study of homo sacer in which he evokes a variety 
of nameless terrains and biopolitical cases to generate the ways and forms of a 
new biopolitics appears fruitless. 19 Biopolitical life, even when purged of what 
Agamben considers to be the toxic exclusion of zoe, remains exclusively intra-
anthropic because the biopolitical space is circumscribed by the action of human 
agents alone. Moreover, looking for a form of life whose bios is only its own 
zoe, as Agamben endeavours to do, suggests the possibility of dispensing with 
inclusion and exclusion without at the same time accounting for the purpose that 
is fulfilled by these actions. For if we regard zoe or bare life only as the result 
of an act of exclusion, we have surely forgotten that all choices, regardless of 
their objects, involve the exclusion of alternatives and of stasis. If, after all, every 
choice could be invalidated simply because it necessarily involved the exclusion 
of something else, we would arrive at a reductio ad absurdum in which no political 
choice (let alone any other choice) is possible at all. 
~ 
Forms of Bare Life in the Anthropology ofRene Girard'? 
In Girardian mimetic theory, what accounts for the existence of sovereign power and 
all social institutions is not any act of inclusion or exclusion but the need to control 
the effects of imitative behaviour between individuals. All life within the category of 
human culture is, according to Girard, made up of the patterns which emerge from 
the dangerous playing out of mimetically learnt desire in the social arena. 
Unlike Agamben, whose analysis of bare life is an attempt to reveal a third 
domain which is neither sacred nor profane, Girard first frames the profane and 
19 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 187. 
46 Intensifies 
the sacred as the spaces in which mimetic pressures respectively unfold and are 
relieved, before discovering in Christianity a tertium quid which offers a real 
encounter with a life which is divine but not sacred in the sense that Girard lends 
to the word. By way of furthering our study of the 'life [that) does not live', we 
will consider here the Girardian profane and sacred and their points of tension 
with Agamben 's analysis, and in the next section we will turn our attention to the 
third possibility for life, as set out by Girard in what is arguably his most important 
work, Des Choses cachees depuis lafondation du monde. 
Girard's fullest account of mimetic desire actually appears in his first work, 
Le Mensonge romantique et la Verite Romanesque.20 In the first section of Des 
Choses cachees, however, he retraces some of the key steps which characterize 
his reflections on this area. Girard's profane occupies the arena of mimetic desire 
as yet uninhibited by taboo, myth, ritual or sca~egoating. Therein, Girard argues, 
all subjective desire emerges from the imitation· of the desires of others. Subjects 
initiate the generation of desire by observing the possession of some good by a 
third person (the model) and by calibrating their own desires against the measure 
provided by this model.21 The collision of wills which this imitation gives rise 
to is what Girard classes as mimetic rivalry, a pathology which usually escalates 
into a condition of violence, leading eventually to the mimetic crisis wherein the 
subject and model become monstrous doubles of each other, contending first over 
the good desired, before finally their rivalry itself becomes the theme of their 
relations. For Girard, the characterization of desire as imitative served initially 
as a literary theory; it explained for him how certain writers, notably Stendhal, 
Flaubert and Dostoyevsky in the nineteenth century, had challenged the Romantic 
view of desire as auto-generative. The development of his theory of desire and its 
links to violence came about through further explorations which Girard conducted 
in classical mythology, as his work took a cultural and anthropological turn in his 
later study La Violence et le Sacre.22 
Clearly, there are objections that could be made to this account of desire - not 
least because of the perpetual chain of desire and imitation that it requires- and to 
Girard's claim that these processes point the way towards the origins of all cultural 
institutions. We shall return to the Girardian account of the origins of institutions 
below. Nevertheless, if we consider mimesis in relation to the question of life, as it 
arises in Agamben 's analysis of biopolitics, we might say that mimesis is Girard 's 
fundamentally intra-anthropic principle since it posits the notion that desire 
arises from contact with the desires of other human agents. As Colby Dickinson 
has observed, there are some correlations here between Agamben and Girard, 
especially given Agamben's reading of Waiter Benjamin's analysis of mimesis, 
20 Rene Girard, Le Mensonge romantique et la Verite Romanesque (Paris: Grasset, 
1961). 
21 Rene Girard, Des Choses cachees depuis la fondation du monde (Paris: Grasset, 
2004 (1978]), p. 18. 
22 Rene Girard, La Violence et le Sacre (Paris: Grasset, 1972). 
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language and violence. In developing his reflections on the consequences ofthe act 
of exclusion, notably in relation to how humanity is differentiated from animality, 
Agamben has even tried to associate the state in which the homo sacer lives with 
a state where mimesis has not yet entered in. As zoe or bare life precedes bios and 
its attendant vices, so for Agamben gesture could precede mimesis and the bios 
to which it leads. The importance of pre-mimetic gesture, as Agamben sees it, is 
that it 'breaks with the false alternative between ends and means that paralyzes 
morality and presents instead means that, as such, evade the orbit of mediality 
without becoming, for that reason, ends'P In this condition, as Dickinson sums 
it up, 'not only are we capable of living without a sovereign politics, enslaved to 
our mimetic heritage, we are, if we embrace it, capable ofliving in a realm of pure 
gesture beyond language as we have known it'.24 
In attributing such power to gesture, however, Agamben is only trying to escape 
the problems which he believes mimesis triggers: the fonns of exclusion which'"' 
produce sovereign power and the differentiation of humanity fr9m animality. 
And yet, in what would such gesture consist if mimesis were not involved? Since 
the communication which gesture evokes would necessitate the sharing (and 
therefore the mimetic passage) of signs without which there could be no mutuality, 
Agamben 's vision of the role that gesture might play in a purified condition of 
biopolitics risks again suffering a reductio ad absurdum. More to the point, from a 
Girardian perspective, the evasion of mimesis would require the resurrection of the 
mensonge romantique or the Romantic lie whose claims to originality are based 
on a veiling of the role of imitation in the generation of culture. Nevertheless, in 
linking mimesis and political or social structures as sources of coercion, Agamben 
perhaps unwittingly echoes the passage which Girard sees between profane 
mimesis and its sacred solutions. If bare life or zoe, the life prior to bios, might 
in Girardian tenns be labelled as the life of unorganized mimesis, in which the 
processes of desire and imitation are unchecked and fre.e to run wild, then bios can 
be associated with the way in which, according to Girard, mimetic desires have 
historically been brought to order within some sacred framework. 
At the climax of the Girardian profane, the point at which the mimetic rivalry 
and the violence it engenders risk destroying all who stand in their path, Girard 
detects mechanisms - including sacred royalty, animal domestication and ritual 
hunting, sexual taboos and funera"f§25 - which, he is convinced, are scattered across 
all cultures in various ways and guises. These sacred rites or institutions restore 
order by confronting and evacuating the dangers posed by the profane realm of 
imitative desire and its attendant violence. Moreover, in Girard's schema these 
manifestations of the sacred are all in one way or another ruled by the process of 
scapegoating in which an individual becomes the object of the common aggression 
23 Giorgio Agamben, Means without Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. Vicenzo Binetti 
and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 [ 1996]), p. 57. 
24 Dickinson, 'Beyond Violence, Beyond the Text', p. 957. 
25 Girard, Des Choses cachees, pp. 68-113. 
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of a community, hitherto divided by unpurged mimetic conflict and subsequently 
restored to peace and cohesion through the effects of the persecution of the 
scapegoat. To crown it all, this entire domain of the Girardian sacred is sustained 
by the emergence of myths that conceal from the community the acts of violence 
which ensure the community's cohesion. The dilemma that the Girardian sacred 
thus poses for life is that, like the Girardian profane, it evokes violence; one of the 
reasons why La Violence et le Sacre upon its publication was hailed by some as an 
atheistic text was that it seemed to give expression to the oft-repeated complaint 
against religion that it is the cause of war or conflict. Unlike the Girardian profane, 
however, the Girardian sacred seeks to displace violence though ritual canalization 
and to conceal it and its purgation through the generation of myth. 
Now, Girard's scapegoat undoubtedly bears some resemblance to Agamben's 
homo sacer with regard to his exclusion from the'\ommunity. Moreover, while 
Girard describes the erection of sacred institutions as the result of trying to control 
mimetic violence, he is by no means saying that they offer an authentic form of 
life, any more than Agamben is content with the act which he believes founds 
sovereignty by excluding homo sacer. In this respect alone Agamben and Girard 
might agree. 
Nevertheless, there is another subtle difference between them even here. By 
the very process of bearing the burdens of the community's violence, the Girardian 
scapegoat, unlike Agamben 's homo sacer, becomes something unholy and holy; 
unholy or sacer because it is the target of the pent-up aggression of the community 
in mimetic crisis, and holy or sanctus because its death or exclusion is associated 
by the community with a return of harmony and the re-establishment ofunity. In 
this light, Christopher Fox's attempt to establish correlations between Agamben 
and Girard rather oversteps the mark for the sake of synthesis, and in other ways 
misses Agamben's intentions.26 True, as we have noted, Girard's scapegoat seems 
to represent an excluded life like the homo sacer. Claiming, however, as Fox does, 
that both Girard and Agamben turn to religion in the search for tools to deconstruct 
the indissoluble dichotomy of friend-enemy (as defined by Car! Schmitt) fails to 
highlight sufficiently Agamben 's secularist agenda. This agenda is most clearly 
inscribed in the annexation of Pauline messianism which Agamben undertakes in 
The Time that Remains: A Commentaty on the Letter to the Romans and in which 
he seeks to create a kind of temporal axis along which bare life and biopolitics 
can find their chronological coorainatesY The time that remains for Paul before 
the eschaton and the second coming of Christ is mobilized by Agamben as a 
way of describing an excluded moment. This is expressed by Paul in the Greek 
hos me, but Agamben understands it not as a gaze towards some future destiny 
(with its supposed indifference to the present) but as a time of indistinction, the 
chronological analogue of the indistinct space in which homo sacer dwells. 
26 Fox, 'Sacrificial Pasts and Messianic Futures', p. 586. 
27 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commenta1y on the Letter to the 
Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005 (20001). 
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Fox's conclusion that this argument represents a use of religion - rather than 
a detournement which is aimed specifically at bringing under secular control the 
'hunchback dwarf' of theology whose doctrines (says Agamben, echoing Waiter 
Benjamin) act like puppet strings on materialist thought28 - is itselfintra-anthropic 
in its assumptions since it appears not to interrogate fully the uses to which 
religion is being put. Fox acknowledges that Agamben and Girard both challenge 
Schmitt's reading of the friend-enemy division as the basis for political life, but 
claims that while Agamben, 'disrupts the binary categories that underlie politics 
and ideology',29 Girard only restores that binary division as an unconscious coda 
to his theories. Yet the truth of the matter is almost the exact contrary: Girard does 
indeed break the binary division of friend-enemy not through the creation of some 
indeterminate state of pre-mimetic gesture wherein such rivalry is supposedly 
overcome, but rather by introducing a third agent, the divine life, as a factor within 
the constitution of human community. 
L ife as Human L ife plus Divine Life 
Girard's singularity as an anthropologist in the contemporary period is that not 
only is he averse to the deconstruction of the human - the dismantling of the 
'anthropological machine', as Agamben calls it30 - he is also quite prepared to 
undermine the idea that the social and physical sciences can offer no insight into 
matters spiritual. It is not that Girard thinks Christianity is a religion whose faith is 
rationally demonstrable; rather, he sees himself as an enemy of that kind of social 
science according to which 'if an argument is favourable to Christianity, no matter 
its lack of importance or its justifications, it cannot be scientific'. 31 Girard, in other 
words, is open to the possibility that anthropological science can point to a kind of 
life for humanity which is not purely and exclusively intra-anthropic. 
Girard has written several works in recent years about God, Christianity and 
culture, notably Dieu existe-t-il? and Christianisme et modernite (2009) with 
Gianno Vattimo. It was Des Choses cachees depuis la fondation du monde, 
however, which established tHe gran des !ignes of his thinking about Christianity. 
In the biblical accounts of Cain and Abel, in the persecution of Joseph by his 
brothers and, ultimately, in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, acts of 
mimetic violence or apparent scapegoating unfold. The violence they contain, 
however, is not disguised but condemned, and in the case of Joseph and Jesus, the 
conflict is solved through an act of self-renunciation and forgiveness obviating 
the processes of revenge and retaliation inscribed in the mimetic conflict. Instead 
28 Ibid., pp. 138-9. 
29 Fox, 'Sacrificial Pasts and Messianic Futures', p. 589. 
30 Agamben, The Open, p. 33. 
31 Rent~ Girard, Les Origines de la Culture: Entretiens avec Pierpaolo Antonello et 
Joao Cezar de Castro Rocha (Paris: Hachette, 2004), p. 265, my translation. 
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of rivalry and violence being avoided through taboo and ritual, cleansed through 
scapegoating and concealed through myth, their cause is removed by an action 
which resembles the generous nature of a selfless love, rather than the self-
regarding nature of exacting psychological catharsis. 
In fact, Girard contends that in the evangelical accounts of the death of Christ, 
the numinous atmosphere associated with sacred rites of purely human origin is 
deliberately eschewed. This eschewal, and its apparently profane implications, 
point not to a demystified zone, as if Girard's reading of the gospel was really 
a return to a theology ofErnest Renan- even if there are clear tensions between 
Girard's historico-critical readings of the Christian scriptures and Christian 
doctrine; he has in fact modified certain of his theses, notably concerning sacrifice, 
after dialogue with theologians such as Raymond Sch\yagerl2 - but rather indicate 
a turning from violence in what is called la surtranscendance de !'amour (the 
supra-transcendence of love) and in which Girard finds the presence of the 
divine.33 The utter uniqueness of this solution to mimesis and violence is, for 
Girard, proof enough that it is the work of an agent who is more than human, since 
only an extra-human (or supra-human) perspective is capable of bringing humans 
to an awareness of the dangers of mimesis. Faced with the question of life, this 
surtranscendance offers to the 'life [that] does not live' a way out of its dilemma 
by modelling a new form of living in which the intra-anthropic domain is forced 
to open up to possibilities that are divine in origin. 
It is right to point out here that Girard firstly sees such a possibility as an 
anthropological observation, though undoubtedly for Girard it is also a postulate 
of faith. Still, while the mechanisms that deflect violence through ritual and 
myth show the deployment of strategies against mimetic hostility in human 
communities, it is only the freedom of the Judeo-Christian scriptures from these 
dynamics which, in Girard's argument, allows them to act as a lens through which 
to judge all cultures mired in the logic of the scapegoat. We might even say that 
their avoidance of myth amounts in fact to the raw material of revelation since 
they seek to unveil an action and initiative - a life! - which begins as a divine 
intervention. This is how we can explain Girard's term la surtranscendance de 
/'amour: in la surtranscendance there is expressed a reality above the human 
construction of sacred gods, and in !'amour there is a relationship to the divine 
which begins in a divine initiative. 
Hence, Girard's thought expands or reconceptualizes intra-anthropic living-
those relations which exhaust the juridico-political thinking of Schmitt as well 
as Agamben and many others - by pointing to an encounter with what we can 
dare to call the theandric possibilities made available in the Christian paradigm. 
By theandric we mean not those possibilities which are associated with the 
32 Raymund Schwager, Must there be Scapegoats? Violence and Redemption in the 
Bible, trans. Maria L. Assad (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987). 
33 Girard, Des Choses cachees, p. 317. 
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perichoresis of Christ, but theandric by analogy - a relatedness, a shared life -
which is proposed between God and humanity. 
Conclusion 
How might life live for Agamben and Girard? There is a curious paradox in 
answering this question insofar as ·Girard's and Agamben's arguments take them 
beyond the domains of the sacred and the profane. Yet there is this difference also: 
beyond Agamben 's profane and sacred lies the realm of biopolitics, and a project 
in which bare life, zoe, must find a bios that does not exclude zoe as its founding 
principle. Life can only live for Agamben on those terms. Beyond Girard's realm 
of the sacred and profane, on the other hand, lies a solution to the threat which 
mimetic conflict poses to life, a solution that offers the possibility of relatedness 
to the divine. Life lives, for Girard, when the surtranscendance de I 'amour breaks 
through the sentence of perpetual conflict which purely intra-anthropic relations 
impose on human life and human living. In Girardian terms, this surtranscendance 
surely is the Life which Eliot felt that we had lost in living. 
Likewise, the life that Girard identifies beyond the profane and the sacred 
raises many issues, not the least of which lies in the perennial problem of the 
credibility of Christian postulates to a humanist academy. Even if the Christian 
solution to mimesis is unique, is that necessarily a proof of its divine origins? 
Another problem which critics have not been slow to point out is the often violent 
character of Christian history. Since there is not space here to deal with all such 
objections, let us simply try to position Girard's thought in relation to the domain 
of the intra-anthropic which is, after all, the hegemonic episteme of the twenty-
first century in the West. 
In Also sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche, with whose philosophy Girard is in 
constant dialogue, proclaimed the death ofGod.34 Thereby he did not, of course, 
mean the death of a divinity as such but the end of God as what later philosophers 
would call a cultural construct. Nietzsche's successors have, as Gabriel Marcel 
observes in Les Hommes contre l'Humain, also sought to announce the death of 
humanity; thereby, again, Marcel did not so much mean the death of humanity as 
a race - though Les Hommes contre..~l'Humain was written in the shadow of the 
mushroom clouds ofNagasaki and Hiroshima- but rather the death of humanity 
in its Western conceptualization.3s Now, Agamben's homo sacer corresponds to 
these two conceptual deaths insofar as it attempts to give expression to a human 
life placed beyond human and divine conceptualizations. We are all, Agamben 
says, homines sacri. Still, in the light of such an observation, and in the light 
of the frequent hostility of the academy to matters religious, perhaps Girard 's 
34 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000 
[ 1883-85]). 
JS Gabriel Marcel, Les Hommes contre l'Humain (Paris: La Colombe, 1952). 
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importance lies first in whether his thought genuinely encounters this problem of 
the deconstruction of the Western notion of humanity; second, whether it offers 
some genuine alternative to Adomo's 'life [that) does not live'; and third, whether 
it can posit instead the credibility, the recovery or we might say the resurrection 
of possibilities that offer to draw Agamben 's homo sacer out of its exclusion and 
back into a theandric life. 
~ 
